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This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter investigates the impact of 
insurance affordability criteria on uninsured losses. The vehicle for analysis is a model of a 
catastrophe insurance market with explicit representation of the key stakeholders (homeowners, 
primary insurers and reinsurers). The theoretical framework is applied in a case study of eastern 
North Carolina with spatially explicit representation of hurricane damage due to wind and storm 
surge. We evaluate the effect of an affordability threshold expressed as a percentage of a home 
value. If the cost of insurance exceeds 1% or 2% of home value the home is uninsured due to the 
affordability constraint. We find that the homes that fail the affordability test account for a high 
proportion of expected losses in the high risk region or our study area and subsidization of 
insurance rates would not be cost effective.  
The second chapter investigates the impact of insurance affordability criteria on uninsured 
natural catastrophe losses and addresses the question of whether a voluntary, affordable 
catastrophe insurance market is viable. We use the same game theoretic modeling framework and 
the same study case used in the first paper. Examining affordability thresholds of 1% or 2% of 
home value, we find that homes that fail the affordability test account for a high proportion of 
expected losses in the high risk region of our study area, public subsidization of insurance rates 
would not be cost-effective, and private subsidization would destroy incentives for insurers to 
participate in the market. We conclude that a combination of insurance, retrofit, and acquisition is 
necessary to address regional hurricane risk. 
The third chapter develops a dynamic modeling framework for the natural catastrophe 
insurance market. This framework includes (1) discrete choice models for the homeowner 
insurance purchase decision; (2) discrete choice models for retrofit; (3) explicit modeling of the 
interaction between competing insurance carriers and a heterogeneous homeowner population; and 
(4) a probabilistic representation of hurricane occurrences over time.  
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CHAPTER 1  
AFFORDABILITY OF NATURAL CATASTROPHE INSURANCE:  GAME 
THEORETIC ANALYSIS AND GEOSPATIALLY EXPLICIT CASE STUDY 
1.1  Introduction 
In the recent decades, the cost of natural disasters like hurricanes has increased 
dramatically with the substantial growth in coastal populations (Kunreuther 1998). The two most 
important and effective ways to manage regional catastrophe risk is natural disaster catastrophe 
loss insurance and mitigation. However, studies have shown that homeowners do not invest in 
sufficient pre-event mitigation and often do not fully insure their properties to reduce losses 
(Kreisel and Landry 2004; Dixon et al. 2006; Kunreuther 2006). As a result, when a damaging 
hurricane occurs, government financial aid must come in to the affected area to provide relief and 
fuel community recovery. These large and unanticipated expenditures strain local and state 
government budgets and represent an additional tax burden for society (Kunreuther and Pauly 
2004). In order to encourage flood insurance adoption, the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP) has in the past provided flood insurance at highly subsidized rates that do not reflect the 
true actuarial risk. Offering insurance at rates that do not reflect the true risk is not financially 
sustainable and consequently, the NFIP had a $24 billion deficit as of 2013 (Atreya et al. 2015). 
Similarly, many state wind catastrophe pools are also at risk of insolvency (Baker and Moss, 2009).   
To place the NFIP on sounder financial footing, the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance 
Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12) was passed by Congress and called for flood insurance premiums 
that more accurately reflected the actual risk to properties from flooding. The move to implement 
risk-based rates drew a public outcry from property owners that faced insurance rates that could 
double or more. Hence, public pressures led Congress to reconsider the notion of the full 
implementation of risk-based premiums passing the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability 
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Act of 2014 (HFIAA 2014). HFIAA 2014 suggests a standard for affordability of 1% of the value 
of the home. That is, premiums that exceed the 1% threshold are assumed to be not affordable 
(NRC, 2015). Both BW-12 and HFIAA called on FEMA to provide a framework for considering 
affordability. For discussions on affordability see GAO (2016), NRC (2015). Two recent papers 
that examine affordability of coverage for two different areas are Kousky and Kunreuther (2014) 
for Ocean City, New Jersey and Zhao, Kunreuther, and Czajkowski (2016) that focuses on 
Charleston County, South Carolina. Both studies concentrate on resolving the challenge to 
implement risk-based premiums that are also sensitive to affordability issues. The question of 
insurance affordability is not unique to flood insurance. We examine the effect of affordability 
criteria on insurance for wind and flood damage caused by hurricanes. This chapter utilizes a 
framework developed in Gao et al. (2016) to explore the number of households that could be 
affected by different affordability thresholds and the effect the threshold would have on the price 
and take up rate of insurance 
1.2  Nested Modeling Framework 
This section gives a brief description of the modeling framework used in this study. For a 
more complete description see (Gao et al., 2016). Figure 1 shows the structure of the interacting 
models. We consider homeowners, primary insurers, reinsurers and the government as the key 
stakeholders in the natural catastrophe insurance market. We use a Cournot-Nash game theoretic 
model, to represent the strategic interactions among insurers that compete in a regional insurance 
market. An expected utility-based homeowner decision model is used to predict homeowner 
insurance purchase behavior (based on the cost of the policy, expected losses, and homeowner risk 
attitudes).  A stochastic optimization model is used to optimize primary insurers’ pricing decisions 
and how much risk the insurer will retain or transfer to reinsurers. A regional catastrophe loss 
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model that couples the frequency of damaging hurricanes with location and building resistance is 
used to estimate the loss to each homeowner and primary insurer. We include the impact of the 
government in the primary insurers’ stochastic optimization model by placing requirements on the 
cash reserves to be held by the primary insurer proportional to the magnitude of their liability. The 
reinsurer is assumed to offer reinsurance at a formula-based price that depends on the expected 
loss of the primary insurer and the standard deviation of the loss. The loss model estimates the 
financial losses in each hurricane event and, based on the cost of insurance and the resultant take-
up rate for insurance, these losses are allocated to homeowners, insurers and reinsurance.  
 
Figure 1.1. Structure of interacting models in nested framework 
1.2.1  Loss Model 
There are two parts in the loss estimation model. One is the hazards simulation, and the 
other is loss estimation for each residential building for each hazard. We use as input to the loss 
model, a set of 97 probabilistic hurricane scenarios developed in Apivatanagul et al. (2011), using 
the Optimization-based Probabilistic Scenario (OPS) method. In order to include the financial 
implications of the number and severity of hurricanes experienced over time, we create 2,000 
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scenarios of a 30-year period developed in Peng (2014).  In the hazards simulation, for each 
scenario, open terrain 3-sec. peak gust wind speeds and surge depths were computed throughout 
the study region using the storm surge model ADCIRC (Westerink et al. 2008). The loss estimation 
is a component-based building loss model that relates probabilistic resistances of building 
components to wind speeds and flood depths, considering the effects of wind pressure, missiles 
and the internal pressure gradient resulting from a breach of the building envelop. The residential 
buildings are classified into different groups by their location 𝑖, building category 𝑚, resistance 
level 𝑐 and risk regions 𝑣 ∈ [𝐻, 𝐿], where 𝐻 denotes high risk region and 𝐿 denotes a lower risk 
region. The number of buildings in each group is identified, denoted as 𝑋𝑖𝑚𝑐𝑣, and the loss for a 
specific hurricane hazard ℎ for a specific building of type 𝑖, 𝑚, 𝑐, 𝑣, is estimated by the model 
developed in Peng et al. (2013), denoted as 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑐𝑣
ℎ . 
1.2.2  Homeowner Model 
We assume all the homeowners in the catastrophe insurance market are risk averse rational 
decision makers that maximize expected utility.  Their level of risk aversion differs with their 
location within regions, v ∈ [𝐻, 𝐿], and 𝑥 is the expenditures either from catastrophe damage or 
insurance payments. In the event of a damaging hurricane, the portion of loss that homeowners are 
assumed to pay, 𝐵𝑖𝑚𝑐𝑣
ℎ , which is the minimum of the loss experienced and the deductible level d. 
We also assume each homeowner has an affordability threshold for insurance (and that threshold 
can vary based on the home’s location in either the high or low risk region) where that threshold 
is a percentage, 𝜅𝑣, of their home values, 𝑉𝑚.   
1.2.3  Insurer Model 
Each insurer is assumed to maximize profit using a stochastic optimization procedure that 
prices insurance coverage given actuarial risk, homeowner demand, the number of competitors, 
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and the cost of reinsurance. Insurers select prices 𝑝𝑣, 𝑣 ∈ [𝐻, 𝐿] per dollar of expected loss to be 
covered in each risk region. The price per dollar of coverage is the sum of 1 plus a specified 
administrative loading factor 𝜏 and a profit loading factor 𝜆𝑣. If the premium is less than a 
minimum annual cost associated with servicing a policy, then the insurer will not offer the policy, 
the minimum specified value is r.  For the price offer 𝑝𝑣, homeowners choose whether or not to 
buy the insurance. The premium collected is the price 𝑝𝑣 multiplied by the expected insured loss 
𝑄𝑣. In the event of a hurricane ℎ, the loss to an insured building 𝐿
ℎ is covered by several parties. 
Homeowners pay the first portion of the loss up to deductible 𝑑, denoted as 𝐵ℎ. Reinsurers pay a 
specified co-participation percentage, 𝛽%, of the loss between the attachment point, 𝐴, and the 
maximum limit, 𝑀. Reinsurers require an annual premium 𝑟𝑠𝑦, including a base premium 𝑏 and a 
reinstatement payment. Primary insurers pay the remaining part of the loss. The optimization 
model for the primary insurance uses the 2,000 scenarios (each of which gives a unique time series 
of hurricanes over 30 years) to optimize the price of the policy to the homeowners in each risk 
region, 𝑝𝑣, and the attachment point A, the maximum limit M for the reinsurance policy. The 
government requires that primary insurers have cash reserves in order to limit the risk of 
insolvency. We assume that the primary insurers will start their business with an initial investment 
𝐶𝑠0 that equals a specified constant 𝑘 multiplied by the annual premiums received in all risk 
regions. In each year 𝑦, they will reallocate the amount of their accumulated surplus 𝐶𝑠𝑦 larger 
than 𝐶𝑠0 into other lines of business. If the accumulated surplus becomes zero or less, the primary 
insurer becomes insolvent.  
1.2.4 Cournot-Nash Model 
A Cournot-Nash game theoretic equilibrium model is used to capture the competition 
between primary insurers. All carriers have the same knowledge of the risk, the market, and only 
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provide full coverage insurance to homeowners. In other words, they face the same cost structure. 
Gao et al. (2016) discusses the Cournot-Nash game and a collusive joint profit maximization 
framework to describe the range of possible outcomes of a dynamic game in this context.  The 
homeowner model is used to derive a demand function for each risk region, 𝑄𝑣 =
𝐷𝑣(𝑝𝑣), 𝑣𝜖[𝐻, 𝐿], with its inverse: 𝑝𝑣 = 𝑃𝑣(𝑄𝑣) = 𝐷𝑣
−1(𝑄𝑣), 𝑣 ∈ [𝐻, 𝐿], where 𝑄𝑣 is the total 
insured loss covered by primary insurers or reinsurers in the entire region 𝑣 and 𝑝𝑣 is the price for 
that region. If there are 𝑛 primary insurers (carriers) in the market, by symmetry, we can rewrite 
the inverse demand function as:  𝑝𝑣 = 𝑃𝑣(𝑄𝑣) = 𝐷𝑣
−1(𝑄𝑣) = 𝐷𝑣
−1(𝑛𝑞𝑣), 𝑣 ∈ [𝐻, 𝐿], where 𝑞𝑣 is 
the expected loss insured by one primary insurer in the region 𝑣. From the stochastic optimization 
insurer model, we can derive a cost function for each primary insurer in terms of the expected loss 
insured: 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝐶(𝑞𝐻, 𝑞𝐿). So we can derive the net profit for each primary insurer as follows: 
𝜋(𝑞𝐻, 𝑞𝐿) =∑𝑞𝑣𝑃𝑣(𝑛𝑞𝑣)
𝑣
− 𝐶(𝑞𝐻, 𝑞𝐿) ∀𝑣 = [𝐻, 𝐿] 
𝑞𝑣𝑗
∗  is the coverage offered by insurer 𝑗 that maximizes profit in the region 𝑣, given n competitors. 
This model takes into consideration the optimal reaction of competitors to every 𝑞𝑣𝑗 chosen by 
insurer j.   
1.3  CASE STUDY 
1.3.1  Inputs 
The case study uses 503 census tracts covering eastern North Carolina.  The case study 
area includes low-lying coastal counties and extends westward to include half of Raleigh, the state 
capital. On average, a tropical storm or hurricane is expected to make landfall on the North 
Carolina coast every four years (SCONC 2010). Recent hurricanes affecting North Carolina 
include Floyd (1999), Isabel (2003), Irene (2011) and Mathew (2016).  We classify this region into 
two risk (H, L) zones by distance from the coastline, which yields 731 geographic zones. We 
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defined 8 categories of buildings based on the number of stories, garage, and roof type. For each 
category, there are 68 building resistance levels. The total inventory reaches 931,902 in two risk 
zones. We used the component-based loss simulation model to estimate both wind and flood 
damages for each type of building at each location. The loss calculation process includes 2000 
scenarios of (probabilistic event-based, with a set of 97 events) 30 year (with 20 time steps per 
year) hazard simulation, and a joint probability distribution estimation of annual loss for each type 
of building under each possible hurricane event. We embed the loss model into individual 
homeowner and insurer models to derive the insurer’s optimal cost function.  We repeat the loss 
estimation with a varying portfolio of insured buildings (as determined by the homeowner decision 
model) and conduct a stochastic optimization for managing risk for the book of business. In the 
insurer model, the deductible level 𝑑 = $5000, co-participation factor 𝛽% = 95%, administrative 
loading factor 𝜏 = 0.35, factor defining allowed surplus 𝑘 = 3. We set the minimum premium 
required by the insurer to offer insurance at 𝜌 = $100. 
1.3.2  Results 
First, strictly in terms of expected loss, are there homes with expected loss that exceeds 1% 
of home value? The shaded areas in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 identify homes with expected loss of more 
than 1% of the home value. Table 1.1 shows the count of households that fit categories of expected 
loss as a percentage of home value that range from below 0.5% to 6.0%. In the low risk region 
there are 4,608 (0.7%) of the 649,012 homes in the risk region whose expected loss exceeds 1% 
of the home value. In the high risk region 81,577 (28.8%) of the 282,890 homes in the area within 
2 miles of the coast have expected losses that exceed 1 % of the home value. Table 1.2 provides 
the total expected loss associated with each of categories. When we examine the total expected 
losses for each region that fall past the 1% threshold, we find expected loss of $13,036,610 and 
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$338,026,398 for the low and high risk regions respectively. Using information from the loss 
model alone, we find that 9.2% of the homes account for roughly 59% of total expected loss. 
Table 1.1. Number and Proportion of Households as a Function of the Expected Loss Expressed 
as a Percentage of the Home Value for Low and High Risk Regions 
Region Low Risk High Risk 
Number of Households 649,012 100.00% 282,890 100.00% 
Expected 
Loss/Home 
Value 
[0,0.5%] 584,335 90.03% 159,847 56.51% 
(0.5%, 1%] 60,069 9.26% 41,466 14.66% 
(1%, 2%] 3,794 0.58% 34,484 12.19% 
(2%,3%] 83 0.01% 26,154 9.25% 
(3%,4%] 731 0.11% 15,721 5.56% 
(4%,5%] 0 0.00% 4,589  1.62% 
(5%,6%] 0 0.00% 629  0.22% 
(6%,+∞) 0 0.00% 0  0.00% 
Table 1.2. Proportion of Total Expected Loss Assigned to Homes that Exceed 1% of Home 
Value for Low and High Risk Regions 
Region Low Risk High Risk 
Total Expected Loss ($) 148,610,960 100.00% 445,686,656 100.00% 
Expected 
Loss/Home 
Value 
[0,0.5%] 112,736,200 75.86% 63,886,828 14.33% 
(0.5%, 1%] 22,838,570 15.37% 43,772,532 9.82% 
(1%, 2%] 8,127,765 5.47% 88,921,568 19.95% 
(2%,3%] 332,270 0.22% 117,121,040 26.28% 
(3%,4%] 4,576,575 3.08% 91,312,312 20.49% 
(4%,5%] 0 0.00% 35,565,316  7.98% 
(5%,6%] 0 0.00% 5,106,162  1.15% 
(6%,+∞) 0 0.00% 0  0.00% 
The remainder of our analysis moves beyond the loss model to incorporate the effect of the 
interaction of all stakeholders in the nested model. The system equilibrium price of insurance and 
hence the cost of insurance to homeowners depends on the expected value of the loss, homeowner 
risk attitudes, the number of insurance carriers in the market, the cost of reinsurance, and 
government imposed reserve requirements. All insurers offer insurance in both markets though, 
potentially at different prices per dollar of expected loss. We will focus on affordability thresholds 
of the cost of insurance as a percentage of home value of 1% and 2%. If a home falls below the 
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affordability threshold, it will not be insured.   
The equilibrium prices for one through five insurers for both the low and high risk region 
and 1% and 2% thresholds are shown in Figure 1. As expected, when we step away from a single 
monopoly insurer, insurance prices in equilibrium will decline as the number of competitors 
increases. The affordability threshold takes potential buyers out of the market when the price of 
insurance exceeds either 1% or 2% of the home value. The buyers left out due to affordability have 
either lower home values or the higher risk or both. The extreme case would be the monopolist 
that would find it most profitable to “cherry pick” and serve only the lower risk/highest home value 
clients in both the high risk and low risk regions.  
 
Figure 1.2. Equilibrium Prices for 1 through 5 Carriers for Each Affordability Threshold 
The effect of the 1% and 2% affordability thresholds on the number of uninsured 
households and the proportion of total expected loss covered is summarized in the four-panel 
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 for the low and high risk regions respectively. In Figure 1.3 a and b, the solid 
black portion represents the proportion of the 649,012 homes in the low risk region that would 
exceed the affordability threshold. The left portion of each bar represents the homes that would 
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choose to insure and the right hand portion of each bar represents homes that would be uninsured 
due to reasons other than the affordability constraint. Other reasons include expected utility 
optimizing homeowner choice not to insure or the minimum premium required by the insurer to 
offer insurance is not met. Under fairly competitive conditions with five firms in the market, 
roughly one half of the homeowners are predicted to insure. Panels c and d of Figure 3 present the 
proportion of $148,610,488 total expected loss that would be covered by insurance. Using the five-
firm case, focusing on the homes uninsured due to the affordability threshold, although they 
represent around 2-4% of the number of homes in the low risk region, they potentially account for 
approximately 18% to 27% of total expected losses for the two affordability thresholds.  
 
Figure 1.3. (a, b) Proportion of Households that do and do not Insure (c, d) Proportion of Total 
Insured and Uninsured Expected Losses in Low Risk Region 
Moving to the high risk region summarized in Figure 1.4, results indicate an even more 
dramatic impact of the affordability thresholds. Of the 282,890 homes in the high risk region, 31% 
to 43% would be uninsured due to the affordability threshold for the five-firm case. At the 1% 
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(2%) threshold, 86% (78%) of the total expected losses would be uninsured due to the affordability 
constraint. The affordability constraint affects a considerable proportion of the expected losses in 
both risk regions.  
 
Figure 1.4. (a, b) Proportion of Households that do and do not Insure (c, d) Proportion of Total 
Insured and Uninsured Expected Losses in High Risk Region 
Figure 1.5 provides a summary of the total insurance premiums that would be collected 
and total primary insurance industry profit predicted for the case study area. Raising the threshold 
from 1% to 2% qualifies more homes to purchase insurance and thus increases the number of 
homes insured and the total premiums collected. The five-firm and 2% affordability scenario at 
the more competitive range of the industry would collect a total of $165,032,330 in premiums and 
produce $62,927,880 in profit divided between five firms.   
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Figure 1.5. Total Premium Collected and Industry Profit at 1% and 2% Threshold 
Lastly we ask the question, “How much subsidy would be required to make insurance 
affordable under the 1% and 2% threshold rule?” Figure 1.6 illustrates the total cost of a subsidy 
for the high risk and low risk regions. The total budget necessary to fully subsidize insurance 
premiums to meet a 1% or 2% threshold is high. For the five-firm case and 2% affordability 
threshold it would still require a $417,520,192 expenditure for the high risk region and $9,919,247 
for the low risk region with all other cases requiring an even larger expenditure of public funds.    
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Figure 1.6. Total Subsidy Required to Bring Cost of Insurance to 1% and 2% Affordability 
Threshold 
1.4  Conclusions 
This study explores the effect of two levels of affordability criteria in a nested model that 
takes account of the interaction of homeowners, primary insurers, reinsurance, and the government 
in a region that is vulnerable to flooding and wind damage due to hurricanes. This study focuses 
on the current stock of homes in a study area of eastern North Carolina and their level of resistance 
to hurricane damage. Resistance depends on location of the buildings and their structural 
characteristics. Insurance decisions are assumed to be made by risk averse expected utility 
maximizing homeowners. Homeowners face insurance prices determined by an insurance industry 
comprised of one to five carriers that interact within a noncooperative Cournot-Nash game 
theoretic framework. All stakeholders have knowledge of the loss distribution due to hurricane 
damage. We find that a relatively low percentage of homes in the region account for a considerable 
percentage of the expected losses. When the affordability criteria that cost of insurance cannot 
 14 
exceed 1% or 2% of the home value, we find that about 80% of total expected losses would 
represent homes that fail to meet this criteria in a high risk region within two miles of the coastline. 
This study does not take into account any retrofit strategies to mitigate the risk and make homes 
more resistant to hurricane damage. We estimate the total amount of public funds necessary to 
subsidize insurance for the homes that do not meet the affordability thresholds.  Without coupling 
the subsidy with strategies to encourage homeowners to mitigate the risk, the required subsidy is 
excessive relative to the total expected losses for the study area. Our conclusions, based on this 
study are similar to those given by Zhao, Kunreuther, and Czajkowski (2015) that recommends 
against subsidized premiums. Rather, accurately priced insurance premiums that communicate the 
true risk of hazardous locations should be coupled with assistance for low income homeowners 
and approaches that encourage individual and community-wide hazard mitigation will be more 
effective policy instruments for mitigating risk.       
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CHAPTER 2  
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FINANCING OF NATURAL CATASTROPHE 
INSURANCE TO MEET AFFORDABILITY CRITERIA 
2.1  Introduction 
This paper utilizes an integrated computational framework to assess the effect of different 
financing options for natural catastrophe insurance that satisfy an insurance affordability criterion 
limiting the insurance burden on individual homeowners. Our integrated model represents a range 
of stakeholders in this industry including homeowners, primary insurers, reinsurers, and 
government. A case study for the region of eastern North Carolina is presented as an application 
of the integrated model.   
Affordability of natural catastrophe insurance came to the forefront when the Congress 
passed the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12) that reauthorized the 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). To place the NFIP on sounder financial footing, BW-
12 called for flood insurance premiums that accurately reflected the actual risk to properties from 
flooding. The move to implement risk-based rates drew a public outcry from property owners that 
faced insurance rate increases.[1] In fact, Mississippi, joined by Alabama, Florida, and Louisiana 
filed suit against the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) to block implementation of BW-12.[2] Hence, public pressure led Congress to 
reconsider implementation of risk-based premiums, passing the Homeowner Flood Insurance 
Affordability Act of 2014 (HFIAA 2014). HFIAA suggests a standard for affordability of 1% of 
the value of the home. That is, premiums that exceed the 1% threshold are assumed to be 
unaffordable.[3] 
Both BW-12 and HFIAA called on FEMA to “propose an affordability framework.” For 
discussions on affordability of the NFIP see [4] and [5]. Kousky and Kunreuther (2014) and Zhao, 
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et al. (2016) examine affordability of coverage in Ocean City, New Jersey and Charleston County, 
South Carolina, respectively. Both studies specify a percentage of household income for an 
affordability test where an annual insurance premium greater than 5% of household income would 
require some form of assistance.[6,7] They make the case that discounted premiums should not be 
used to address the affordability issue promoting a voucher program coupled with mitigation loans. 
Kousky and Kunrether (2014) demonstrate that for a hypothetical homeowner in a high wave 
velocity 100-year return interval (V zone) or 100-year return interval (A zone), the cost to the 
federal government for a voucher coupled with mitigation requirement would be less than half of 
a voucher-only program.[6] Zhao et al. (2016) examine a voucher plus home elevation mitigation 
requirement and finds that government expenditures on a combined program would be less than 
half of a voucher-only program.7] Under BW-12, premiums were intended to adjust to the point 
that they reflect the full flood risk of a building as determined by its structural characteristics and 
location. BW-12 was an attempt to address the insolvency issues for the NFIP. Those insolvency 
issues have become even more compelling with the 2017 hurricane season and associated flooding. 
Before the 2017 hurricane season, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported 
that the NFIP owed the Department of Treasury $24.6 billion as of March 2017.[4]   
In a report on comprehensive reform of the NFIP the GAO addressed issues pertaining to 
solvency and resilience.[4] The GAO identified six key interrelated challenges to flood insurance 
reform:  
1) Outstanding debt of the program;  
2) Premium rates that do not reflect the full risk of loss; 
3) Affordability of insurance premiums that ensure consumers will purchase flood    
insurance to protect themselves; 
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4) Low consumer participation in insurance purchase; 
5) Barriers to private-sector involvement; and 
6) Reduced funding for community flood resilience efforts.    
The challenges identified by the GAO for the NFIP are challenges for all natural 
catastrophe insurance programs in the US and worldwide. For example, many state wind 
catastrophe pools are also at risk of insolvency.[8] Internationally, the World Bank Disaster Risk 
Financing and Insurance (DRFI) Program was established in 2010 to “improve the financial 
resilience of governments, businesses and households against natural disasters.”.[9] This research 
addresses four (2,3,4, and 5) of the six challenges described above in the context of wind and flood 
damage caused by hurricanes within an integrated model and case study. It utilizes the framework 
developed in [10] to examine a private-sector insurance industry with voluntary consumer 
participation. Risk-based premium rates are evaluated within a model based on consumer 
demand and the level of competition in the industry. We examine the financial burden of achieving 
an affordability target in a case study of eastern North Carolina. Xu et al. (2017) uses the Gao et 
al. framework to examine the number of households that fall into the tail of the distribution with 
expected losses that exceed 1% or 2% of home value.[11] They find a relatively small number of 
homes is responsible for a disproportionately large share of expected losses. In this paper we look 
at the impact of an affordability constraint that limits the number of households that can purchase 
insurance, the effect on insurance pricing, insurer profitability, and uninsured losses. We examine 
policies that subsidize insurance rates to meet an affordability target, and the stakeholders affected 
by the subsidy burden.  
Section 2.2 summarizes the modeling framework developed in [10]. After presenting the 
results of a case study for North Carolina in Section 2.3, the conclusions are presented in Section 
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2.4.   
2.2  Integrated Modeling Framework 
This section briefly describes the modeling framework used in this study (Figure 2.1). For 
a more complete description see [10]. We consider homeowners, primary insurers, reinsurers, and 
the government as the key stakeholders in the natural catastrophe insurance market. We use a 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium game to represent the strategic interaction among insurers that compete 
in a regional insurance market. An expected utility-based homeowner decision model is used to 
predict individually optimal homeowner insurance purchase behavior (based on the price of 
insurance, expected losses, and homeowner risk attitudes). A stochastic optimization model is used 
to optimize primary insurers’ pricing decisions and to determine firm level risk retention and risk 
transfer choices. A regional catastrophe loss model couples the hurricane hazard modeling with 
building locations and resistances to compute probabilistic estimates of loss to each home over a 
specified number of years. We include the impact of the government in the primary insurers’ 
stochastic optimization model by placing requirements on the cash reserves to be held by the 
primary insurer proportional to the magnitude of their liability. A reinsurer is assumed to offer a 
single layer of catastrophe risk excess of loss reinsurance at a formula-based price that depends on 
the expected loss of the primary insurer and the standard deviation of the loss. Based on the cost 
of insurance and the resultant take-up rate for insurance, the financial losses in each hurricane 
event are allocated to homeowners, insurers, and reinsurers. The analysis incorporates an 
affordability constraint on the household purchase decision and examines the impact on all 
stakeholders. That is, if the premium exceeds this threshold, we assume the homeowner will not 
purchase the insurance. The affordability threshold is specified as the cost of insurance (i.e., 
premium) that exceeds 𝛽% of the value of a home. Using the modeling framework, we examine 
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the implication of hypothetical situations in which the insurance industry or the government 
assumes the burden of subsidizing the insurance premium to ensure affordability. 
 
Figure 2.1. Structure of Interacting Models in Computational Framework 
2.2.1  Loss Model 
There are two parts in the loss estimation model. One is the hazard simulation, and the 
other is loss estimation for each residential building for each hurricane. We use as input to the loss 
model, a relatively small (≈100) set of probabilistic hurricane scenarios developed in [12], using 
the Optimization-based Probabilistic Scenario (OPS) method. In the hazard simulation, for each 
hurricane scenario, open terrain 3-sec. peak gust wind speeds and storm surge inundation depths 
were computed throughout the study region using the storm surge model ADCIRC.[13] In order to 
include the financial implications of the number and severity of hurricanes experienced over time, 
we used the S=2,000 scenarios s of a T=30-year period developed in [14]. The loss estimation is a 
component-based building loss model that relates probabilistic resistances of building components 
to wind speeds and flood depths, considering the effects of wind pressure, missiles and the internal 
pressure gradient resulting from a breach of the building envelop. The residential buildings are 
classified into different groups by their location 𝑖, building category 𝑚, resistance level 𝑐 and risk 
regions 𝑣 ∈ [𝐻, 𝐿], where 𝐻 denotes high risk region and 𝐿 denotes a lower risk region. The 
number of buildings in each group is identified, denoted as 𝑋𝑖𝑚𝑐𝑣, and the loss for a specific 
hurricane hazard event ℎ for a specific building of type 𝑖, 𝑚, 𝑐, 𝑣, is determined by the model 
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developed in [15], denoted as 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑐𝑣
ℎ . 
2.2.2  Homeowner Model 
We assume all the homeowners in the catastrophe insurance market are risk averse rational 
decision makers that maximize expected utility. The distribution of their level of risk aversion 
differs with their location by region, 𝑣 ∈ [𝐻, 𝐿]. In the event of a damaging hurricane, the portion 
of loss that homeowners are assumed to pay, 𝐵𝑖𝑚𝑐𝑣
ℎ , is the minimum of the loss experienced and 
the deductible level d. We also assume each homeowner has an affordability threshold for 
insurance (and that threshold can vary based on the home’s location in either the high or low risk 
region) where that threshold is a percentage, 𝜅𝑣, of their home value, 𝑉𝑚.   
2.2.3  Insurer Model 
Each insurer seeks to maximize profit using a stochastic optimization procedure that 
determines the price of insurance coverage given actuarial risk, homeowner demand, the number 
of competitors, and the cost of reinsurance. Insurers select prices 𝑝𝑣, 𝑣 ∈ [𝐻, 𝐿] per dollar of 
expected loss to be covered in each risk region. The price is the sum of one plus a specified 
administrative loading factor 𝜏 and a profit loading factor 𝜆𝑣. If the total annual premium is less 
than a minimum annual cost associated with servicing a policy, then the insurer will not offer the 
policy. For the offered price, 𝑝𝑣, homeowners choose whether or not to buy full insurance. The 
premium collected is the price 𝑝𝑣 multiplied by the total expected insured loss 𝑄𝑣. In the event of 
a hurricane ℎ, the loss across all insured buildings 𝐿ℎ is shared by several stakeholders. 
Homeowners pay the first portion of the loss through the payment of their individual deductibles 
𝑑, denoted as 𝐵ℎ. Reinsurers pay a specified co-participation percentage, 𝛽%, of the loss between 
the attachment point, 𝐴, and the maximum limit, 𝑀. Reinsurers require an annual premium a 
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reinstatement payment after a claim is made by the primary insurer. Primary insurers pay the 
remaining part of the loss. The optimization model for the primary insurance uses the 2,000 
scenarios (each of which gives a unique time series of hurricanes over 30 years) to optimize the 
price of the policy, 𝑝𝑣, the attachment point A, and the maximum limit M for the reinsurance policy. 
The government requires that primary insurers have cash reserves in order to limit the risk of 
insolvency. We assume that the primary insurers will start their business with an initial investment 
𝐶𝑠0 that equals a specified constant multiplied by the annual premiums received in all risk regions. 
In each year 𝑦, they reallocate the amount of their accumulated surplus 𝐶𝑠𝑦 larger than 𝐶𝑠0 into 
other lines of business. If the accumulated surplus becomes zero or less, the primary insurer is 
considered insolvent.  
2.2.4  Cournot-Nash Model 
A Cournot-Nash game theoretic equilibrium model is used to capture the competition 
among primary insurers. All carriers have the same information on the risk, the market, and only 
provide full coverage insurance to homeowners. In other words, they face the same cost structure. 
Gao et al. (2016) discusses the possible outcomes to the dynamic game that range from the single 
shot Cournot-Nash equilibrium to a collusive joint profit maximum. The homeowner model is used 
to derive a demand function that gives the relationship between the total expected loss covered and 
the price of insurance in each risk zone.  For each risk region, 𝑄𝑣 = 𝐷𝑣(𝑝𝑣), 𝑣𝜖[𝐻, 𝐿], and its 
inverse: 𝑝𝑣 = 𝑃𝑣(𝑄𝑣) = 𝐷𝑣
−1(𝑄𝑣), 𝑣 ∈ [𝐻, 𝐿], where 𝑄𝑣 (𝐷𝑣(. )) is the total expected insured loss 
covered by primary insurers (total demand) or reinsurers in the entire region 𝑣 and 𝑝𝑣 is the price 
for that region. If there are 𝑛 primary insurers (carriers) in the market, by symmetry, we can rewrite 
the inverse demand function as: 𝑝𝑣 = 𝑃𝑣(𝑄𝑣) = 𝐷𝑣
−1(𝑄𝑣) = 𝐷𝑣
−1(𝑛𝑞𝑣), 𝑣 ∈ [𝐻, 𝐿], where 𝑞𝑣 is the 
expected loss insured by one primary insurer in the region 𝑣. From the stochastic optimization 
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insurer model, we derive a cost function, 𝐶(𝑞𝐻, 𝑞𝐿), for each primary insurer in terms of the 
expected loss insured, so we can derive the net profit 𝜋(𝑞𝐻, 𝑞𝐿) for each primary insurer as follows: 
𝜋(𝑞𝐻, 𝑞𝐿) =∑𝑞𝑣𝑃𝑣(𝑛𝑞𝑣)
𝑣
− 𝐶(𝑞𝐻, 𝑞𝐿)            ∀𝑣 = [𝐻, 𝐿] 
where 𝑞𝑣𝑗
∗  is the coverage offered by insurer 𝑗 that maximizes profit in the region 𝑣, given n 
competitors. This model takes into consideration the optimal reaction of competitors to every 𝑞𝑣𝑗 
chosen by insurer j.   
2.3  Case Study 
2.3.1  Inputs 
The case study area is the eastern half of North Carolina, including the low-lying coastal 
counties and extending westward to include half of Raleigh, the state capital (Figure 2.2). On 
average, a tropical storm or hurricane is expected to make landfall on the North Carolina coast 
every two years.[16] Recent hurricanes affecting North Carolina include Floyd (1999), Isabel 
(2003), Irene (2011), and Matthew (2016). We divide the region into 731 census tract-based 
geographic zones for analysis. We also group these small zones into two larger risk zones, where 
all homes within 2 miles of the coast are located in the high risk zone, H, and those located beyond 
this distance are assumed to be in the low risk zone, L. We defined eight categories of buildings 
based on the number of stories, garage, and roof type and one building value for each. For each 
category, there are up to 68 building resistance levels. There are 931,902 homes across both risk 
zones, with 282,890 and 649,012 homes in the high and low risk zones, respectively. We used the 
component-based loss simulation model to estimate both wind and storm surge flood damages for 
each type of building at each location. The loss calculation process includes S=2000 scenarios of 
(probabilistic event-based, with a set of 97 events) 30 years (with 20 time steps per year) hazard 
simulation. It also includes a joint probability distribution estimation of annual loss for each type 
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of building under each possible hurricane event. We embed the loss model into individual 
homeowner and insurer models to derive the insurer’s optimal cost function.  We repeat the loss 
estimation with a varying portfolio of insured buildings (as determined by the homeowner decision 
model which is influenced by the cost of the premiums charged) and conduct a stochastic 
optimization for managing risk for the book of business. In the insurer model, the deductible level 
𝑑 = $5000, co-participation factor 𝛽 = 95%, administrative loading factor 𝜏 = 0.35, and factor 
defining allowed surplus 𝑘 = 3. We set the minimum premium required by the insurer to offer 
insurance at $100. We use lognormal distributions for the risk aversion parameter in the utility 
model for the homeowners and specify the parameters for those distributions so that they are 
consistent with the penetrations in the low and high risk zones given in [17]. For further details 
see [10]. We bound the total premium that may be charged for insurance to be $5.35 per dollar of 
expected loss covered in both risk zones. For example, a $150,000 home with expected annual loss 
of $2,000 would face a maximum annual premium of $10,700. We experiment with a single 
monopoly insurer and an oligopolistic market with 4 carriers for comparison. 
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Figure 2.2. Study Area (Source: Xu et al., 2018[11]) 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the vulnerability of the homes using the ratio of the expected annual loss 
to the value of the home expressed as a percentage. For almost 90,000 of the more than 930,000 
homes in the region, expected loss exceeds 1% of the home value. For the homes that are above 
the 1% threshold, we find  that more than $351 million of the almost $600 million or about 60% 
of total expected loss can be attributed to about 9% of the homes in the region. As illustrated in 
Figure 3, the average annual loss of homes for which that loss is at least 4% of the value of the 
home is almost $7 thousand. Clearly, a relatively small proportion of homes account for a relatively 
large proportion of expected losses.   
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Figure 2.3. Number of Homes and Average Value of the Loss Categorized by  
Expected Loss as a Percentage of Home Value. 
2.3.2  Results 
Table 2 compares (1) premium costs; (2) expected uninsured loss; (3) proportion of 
households insured; and (4) amount of loss uninsured due to affordability limitations across seven 
alternative cases when there are either one or four carriers in the insurance market. Table 3 
compares (1) carrier profit; (2) probability of carrier insolvency; and (3) government or industry 
subsidy required for the same seven cases. Each of the seven cases is defined by an affordability 
threshold in the high and low risk regions, whether or not homeowners can receive a subsidy for 
the amount of the premium beyond the affordability threshold, and if that subsidy is available, the 
source of the subsidy (insurance carriers or government).  
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Table 2.2. Market Characterization for Seven Scenarios 
Case 
Affordability 
threshold Subsidy 
paid by 
Premium per dollar loss ($) Uninsured loss ($M) 
1 carrier 4 carriers 1 carrier 4 carriers 
  
High 
Risk 
Low 
Risk 
High Risk Low Risk High Risk Low Risk High Risk Low Risk High Risk Low Risk 
1 5% 2.50% n/a 4.89 5.35 2.09 3.46 354 99 204 91 
2 1% 1% n/a 5.29 5.35 2.13 2.58 417 111 377 100 
3 2% 2% n/a 5.24 5.35 2.53 3.35 394 104 326 96 
4 1% 1% Govt. 5.35 5.35 5.35 5.35 31 76 31 76 
5 1% 1% Carriers 5.35 5.35 - -   - -   - -   
6 2% 2% Govt. 5.35 5.35 5.35 5.35 45 81 45 81 
7 2% 2% Carriers 5.35 5.35 - -   45 81 - -   
Case 
Affordability 
threshold Subsidy 
paid by 
Proportion of households insured (%) Total expected loss uninsured due to affordability 
1 carrier 4 carriers 1 carrier 4 carriers 
  
High 
Risk 
Low 
Risk 
High Risk Low Risk High Risk Low Risk High Risk Low Risk High Risk Low Risk 
1 5% 2.50% n/a 44% 27% 59% 26% 298 47 135 26 
2 1% 1% n/a 26% 25% 39% 23% 397 46 352 28 
3 2% 2% n/a 35% 26% 43% 25% 365 28 326 16 
4 1% 1% Govt. 71% 28% 71% 28% 0 0 0 0 
5 1% 1% Carriers - -   - -   - -   - -   
6 2% 2% Govt. 68% 28% 68% 28% 0 0 0 0 
7 2% 2% Carriers 68% 28% - -   - -   - -   
Assume 5.35 is maximum insurers are allowed to charge. 
Table 2.3 Annual Industry Performance Across Seven Scenarios 
  
Affordability 
threshold Subsidy 
paid by 
Profit ($M) 
Probability of 
insolvency 
Total subsidy ($M) 
Case High risk Low risk 1 carrier 4 carriers 1 carrier 4 carriers 1 carrier 4 carriers 
1 5% 2.50% n/a 206 110 0.61% 1.35% - - 
2 1% 1% n/a 80 21 0.57% 1.43% - - 
3 2% 2% n/a 126 49 0.66% 1.32% - - 
4 1% 1%  Govt. 1,361 1,361 0.12% 0.15% 1,475 1,475 
5 1% 1% Carriers  - - 100.00% - - - 
6 2% 2% Govt.  1,314 1,314 0.09% 0.13% 1,214 1,214 
7 2% 2% Carriers  - - 100.00% - - - 
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We consider thresholds of 5% and 2.5% of the value of the home to be the affordability 
thresholds in the high and low risk zones, respectively for a “base case” analysis (Case 1). This 
case forms a point of comparison for the remaining six cases. The thresholds of 5% in the high 
risk zone and 2.5% in the low risk zone cover almost all the homes (>99%) in both the low and 
high risk area and these homes represent about 99% and 97% of the expected loss in the high risk 
and low risk zones, respectively if the cost of insurance were exactly the expected loss. Of course 
the cost of insurance always exceeds the expected loss due to an administrative fee and a profit 
loading factor. 
Under the base case, with one insurer the insurance premium is $4.89 and $5.35 per dollar 
of expected loss in the high and low risk zones, respectively (Table 2.2). When there are four 
insurers, the premiums drop to $2.09 and $3.46 in the high and low risk zones, respectively. The 
decline in prices translates into a drop in uninsured losses to $204 and $91 million in the high and 
low risk zones, respectively; hence about 50% of the expected loss is covered by insurance when 
there are four carriers (in comparison 24% when there is a single monopoly carrier). Of the 
expected losses not covered, $135 and $26 million are not covered as a result of affordability 
issues. It is important to remember that in this model, homeowners also may not purchase 
insurance even if they can afford to, either because they are sufficiently risk tolerant based on 
maximizing expected utility (that is, it is not worth it to them to purchase the insurance), or their 
premium would not exceed the $100 threshold for the carriers to be willing to sell the insurance to 
them. With four carriers, the profit is lower than in the monopoly situation reaching $110 million 
profit with four carriers and an annual insolvency rate of about 1.35% (Table 2.3). 
If we assume that affordability concerns on the part of homeowners imply that the 
maximum amount of a policy they can purchase is limited to 1% of the value of their homes (Case 
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2), the market performance, as measured by the amount of expected loss that is insured with four 
carriers, drops to about (1 − 277𝐾 + 100𝐾 600𝐾 ⁄ ) ∗ 100% = 37% from (1 −
204𝐾 + 91𝐾
600𝐾⁄ ) ∗ 100% = 50%. Also, the insurance carriers’ profit drops from $110 
million to about $21 million (Table 3). With a 2% affordability constraint (Case 3) and the same 
four carriers, the amount of expected loss that is insured rises to about (1 −
326𝐾 + 96𝐾
600𝐾 ⁄ ) ∗ 100% = 30%. Notice that prices very marginally increase with the 
decrease in the affordability threshold but more people are able to purchase insurance as we now 
assume they can afford to do so.  
With these lower affordability thresholds of 1% or 2%, many homeowners simply cannot 
afford to purchase insurance though there is a functional, even if somewhat limited, market for 
insurance. Suppose the government were to pay for insurance beyond the affordability threshold.  
In that situation (Cases 4 and 6 in Table 2), the prices increase to $5.35 in both regions and the 
insured loss reaches 82% and 79% when the affordability threshold is 1% and 2%, respectively. 
The uninsured loss increases when the affordability threshold is 2% because more homeowners 
are not willing to purchase as their portion of the cost for insurance rises beyond 1% of the value 
of the home (Case 4 vs. Case 6). Prices increase because homeowners do not experience the costs 
that are charged by the carriers once they cross the affordability threshold. Of course this increase 
in insured loss comes at a substantial expense. The subsidy reaches about $1,475 M/930K homes 
which is about $1600 per home in the study area regardless of whether they purchase or need 
insurance or about $10,000 per home that actually purchases insurance and received a subsidy 
(Case 4). When the affordability threshold is 2%, the subsidy is almost $12,000 per home that 
purchases insurance and receives a subsidy (Case 6). The per home average subsidy increases 
when the threshold rises to 2% for affordability because fewer homes qualify for a subsidy and 
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those homes experience relatively higher expected losses in comparison to the pool of homes that 
qualify with a 1% affordability threshold. From Table 3, it is important to notice that the 
profitability of the carriers increases dramatically when there is a government subsidy (Cases 4 
and 6). Effectively that subsidy flows to the insurers as profit. If industry is required to bear the 
burden of risk by providing full insurance while collecting premiums capped by the affordability 
threshold, there is effectively no market (i.e., no households are insured) regardless of the whether 
the affordability criteria is 1 or 2%. Potential carriers simply cannot earn sufficient profit to attract 
them to the market under these conditions. 
2.4  Conclusions 
This study explores the effect of an affordability criteria in a computational framework that 
takes account of the interaction of homeowners, primary insurers, reinsurance, and the government 
in a region that is vulnerable to flooding and wind damage due to hurricanes. The case study 
focuses on the current stock of homes in a study area of eastern North Carolina and their level of 
resistance to hurricane damage. Resistance depends on location of the homes and their structural 
characteristics. Insurance decisions are assumed to be made by risk averse expected utility 
maximizing homeowners. Homeowners face insurance prices determined by an insurance industry 
comprised of one or four carriers that interact within a noncooperative Cournot-Nash game 
theoretic framework. All stakeholders have knowledge of the loss distribution due to hurricane 
damage. We find that a relatively low percentage of homes in the region account for a considerable 
proportion of the expected losses. With a relaxed affordability criterion of 5% of home value in 
high risk areas and 2.5% in low risk area, voluntary purchase of insurance at risk-based rates is 
sufficient to support a viable private sector insurance industry. When the affordability criteria that 
cost of insurance cannot exceed a 1% or 2% of the home value, we find that about 80% of total 
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expected losses would represent homes that fail to meet this criterion in a high risk region within 
two miles of the coastline. This study does not take into account any retrofit strategies to make 
homes more resistant to hurricane damage thereby mitigating the risk. Further, we explore the 
possibility of allowing the burden to subsidize insurance rates fall on the insurance industry or the 
government. With burden fully placed on the insurance industry, the market would simply 
disappear as profitability from the full insurance buyers is not sufficient to offset the subsidy. The 
cost of subsidizing from public funds averages about $10,000 per household per year with most of 
the subsidy transferring to the insurance industry. If the burden is shared between the homeowner 
and the government, there is a viable insurance market, however, the costs of doing so, do remain 
large. 
Without coupling the subsidy with policies that encourage homeowners to mitigate the risk, 
the required subsidy is excessive relative to the total expected losses for the study area. Our 
conclusions, based on this study are similar to those given in [7] that recommends against 
subsidized premiums. Rather, accurately priced insurance premiums that communicate the true 
risk of hazardous locations should be coupled with assistance for low income homeowners and 
approaches that encourage individual and community-wide hazard mitigation will be more 
effective policy instruments for mitigating risk. In addition, a thoughtful acquisition program for 
the properties at highest risk of hurricane damage is likely a better solution than a carte blanche 
approach of insurance subsidies than hide the ability of insurance premiums to communicate risk. 
For areas vulnerable to hurricane damage, a three pronged approach that includes risk-based 
insurance rates, complemented by grants for retrofit to reduce damage and acquisition program for 
the few highest risk properties is likely to be most effective in promoting risk reduction and 
resilience. Future work will focus on finding the balance of these three strategies as opposed to 
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reliance on insurance alone to manage hurricane risk.   
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CHAPTER 3  
DYNAMIC MODELING OF COMPETITION IN THE NATURAL HAZARD 
CATASTROPHE LOSS INSURANCE MARKET WITH EXPLICIT 
CONSIDERATION OF HOMEOWNER FINANCED MITIGATION 
3.1  Introduction 
The consequences of natural disasters are rapidly escalating. U.S. Losses from Hurricanes 
Harvey and Irma are estimated at between $150 and $200 billion (Horowitz 2017). Natural disaster 
catastrophe loss insurance is currently the most important and effective way to manage regional 
catastrophe risk. However, there exist problems on both the demand and supply side of the 
insurance market. Kunreuther (1996) observes that on the demand side, property owners in hazard-
prone areas usually do not fully insure their properties nor invest sufficiently in mitigations against 
losses from natural disasters. On the supply side, the insurance industry is not willing to promote 
or offer coverage against these events. This has led to the creation of the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP) which offers flood insurance at rates that do not cover the full cost of the 
insurance. For this reason, as of March 2017, the NFIP has a $24.6 billion deficit (Gao 2017). Even 
at these reduced rates, homeowners are underinsured and therefore, the government often must 
come to the rescue when severe events occur with disaster assistance, which results in large and 
unexpected expenditures on government (Kunreuther and Pauly 2004).  
Insurance for natural hazard loss is complicated because the carriers receive a steady stream 
of premiums and this income stream must match against infrequent but potentially very large 
claims. There are other important dynamics at play as well since the interactions between key 
stakeholders in the insurance market (i.e., homeowners, insurers, reinsurers, and government) 
evolve over time. For example, homeowner attitudes evolve over time as their hurricane 
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experience accumulates, which can cause evolutions in their insurance purchase decisions 
impacting aggregate demand for insurance. Evolution in homeowner price sensitivity impacts the 
insurance industry through variability in take up rates and the amount of risk in their portfolio, 
which they adaptively control through pricing and the purchase of reinsurance. Also, the building 
inventory evolves through new building and as homeowners undertake mitigation to reduce losses 
which further impacts the homeowner insurance purchase decision.  
There is a wide array of research focused on the dynamics of individual aspects of this 
problem, but there is little research that comprehensively models the range of dynamics that impact 
the evolving market for natural catastrophe loss insurance. For instance, many researchers develop 
statistical models of the household insurance purchase decision and conclude that previous hazard 
experience (Browne and Hoyt 2000; Zahran et al. 2009; Botzen and van den Bergh 2012b; Petrolia 
et al. 2011; Atreya et al. 2015), homeowner characteristics like income and age (Landry and Jahan-
Parvar 2011; Botzen and van den Bergh 2012a, b; Atreya et al. 2015; Petrolia et al. 2015) and/or 
previous retrofit actions (Petrolia et al. 2015) have a significant influence on the insurance 
purchase decision. Dumm et al. (2011, 2012) focus on the building codes and conclude that 
effective building codes in hazard-prone areas help decrease hazard losses and insurance 
premiums. Kunreuther (2008) discusses the influence of long-term insurance on homeowners and 
insurers. Kleindorfer et al. (2012) examine the demand and supply of annual and multi-year 
insurance with respect to protection against a catastrophe risk in a competitive insurance market. 
Hence, there is an urgent need for establishing a comprehensive tool for researchers, insurance 
industry, and government officers so that effective methods to restructure the natural hazards 
insurance market can be identified.    
Closely related to this research Gao et al. (2016) proposed a game theoretic modeling 
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framework to capture the strategic relationship between the homeowners, insurers, and reinsurers 
in the market in a static context. They applied this framework to analyze the market for insurance 
against hurricane-induced loss in (flood and wind combined) in Eastern North Carolina. Their 
framework is a static, perfect information, Cournot-Nash noncooperative game which integrated 
(1) a utility-based homeowner decision model for insurance purchase; (2) a stochastic optimization 
model of the premium and reinsurance decisions by the primary insurers; and (3) a state-of-the-art 
regional catastrophe loss estimation model.  
Since the framework developed in Gao et al. (2016) has many of the elements needed to 
model the evolving market for natural hazard catastrophe loss, we extend this framework in three 
important ways. First, we replace the utility model for the homeowner insurance purchase decision 
with discrete choice models fitted to survey data (Wang et al. 2017). This allows homeowner 
preferences for insurance to vary based on the socio-economic characteristics of the homeowners 
and with evolving hurricane experience of the household. Second, we extend the framework to 
include opportunities for homeowners to invest in retrofit using Jasour et al. (2018) to allow the 
building inventory to evolve over time. Third, given the evolving tastes of the homeowner and the 
evolving building characteristics via retrofit, we extend the modeling to explicitly represent the 
ability of insurers to vary their pricing decisions as well as their reinsurance practices annually.  
Section 3.2 describes the dynamic framework developed for modeling the insurance 
market. Section 3.3 gives the results of a case study conducted in eastern North Carolina. Section 
3.4 summarizes the key insights from the modeling and analysis and suggests opportunities for 
future research.  
3.2  Modeling Framework 
Figure 3.1 gives the modeling framework including the interactions between the models 
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and the required data. This framework considers homeowners, insurers, reinsurers, and the 
government as the key stakeholders in the natural catastrophe insurance market. The core of the 
model is interacting models that describe the competition between the insurance carriers and the 
price equilibrium that is reached between the carriers and the homeowners. Through these 
interactions, the evolving characteristics of the homeowners and the building stock are explicitly 
integrated in the analysis. 
 
Figure 3.1. Structure of Interacting Models 
Reinsurers and the government are not explicitly presented in Figure 3.1 because we 
assume that their decisions are made outside the framework and form constraints on the actions of 
the carriers. Reinsurers are assumed to offer reinsurance at a cost defined by the mean expected 
insured loss and the standard deviation of that loss. The impact of expected mean insured loss and 
the standard deviation of the loss on the cost of the reinsurance are assumed to be known values. 
We assume that for a given price for insurance in the low and the high risk regions, a stochastic 
optimization model is used by each carrier to optimize their decisions as to how much risk the 
insurer will transfer to reinsurers. The impact of the government on the primary insurers’ is 
represented in the stochastic optimization model by placing requirements on the cash reserves to 
be held by the primary insurer proportional to the magnitude of their liabilities. Similarly, we 
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assume that the government requires a fixed multiple of the premiums written to be available as a 
cash surplus. This multiple is assumed to be given. Hence, these two stakeholders are included via 
input data in the insurers’ stochastic optimization model.  
A regional catastrophe loss model is used to estimate the loss to each homeowner and 
primary insurer after a hurricane. The loss estimation model estimates the financial losses in each 
hurricane event and these losses are allocated to homeowners and insurers based on the insurance 
deductible and the insurance purchase decisions made by each homeowner. A perfect information 
Cournot-Nash model is used to represent the interactions among the homeowners and insurance 
carriers annually. As the characteristics of the homeowners and properties evolve, new equilibrium 
prices for insurance are computed. We assume that carriers have a long term understanding of the 
regional hazard that is updated through the retrofit actions of the homeowners but that hazard 
representation does not include forecasts of the evolving hazard. Rather, that hazard is re-estimated 
annually based on mitigation actions already take so as to set prices for the next policy year. 
3.2.1  Loss Model 
The residential buildings are classified into different groups based on their location 𝑖, 
building category 𝑚, resistance level 𝑐, and risk regions 𝑣 ∈ [𝐻, 𝐿], where 𝐻 denotes a high risk 
region and 𝐿 denotes a low risk region. The number of buildings in each group is identified, 
denoted as 𝑋𝑖𝑚𝑐𝑣. The hurricane hazard is represented by an efficient set of probabilistic hurricane 
scenarios ℎ ∈ (1,… ,𝐻). Each hurricane scenario has an associated hazard-adjusted annual 
occurrence probability Ph such that when probabilistically combined, the set of hurricane scenarios 
represents the regional hazard (Apivatanagul et al. 2011). The loss for a specific hurricane hazard 
ℎ for a specific building of type 𝑖, 𝑚, 𝑐, 𝑣, is estimated by a combination of a modified version of 
Florida Public Hurricane Loss Model (FPHLM 2005) for the wind-related loss and Taggart and 
 41 
van de Lindt (2009) and van de Lindt and Taggart (2009) for the flood-related loss, denoted as 
𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑐𝑣
ℎ . 
3.2.2  Homeowner Model 
When hurricane occurs, the homeowners are assumed to pay, 𝐵𝑖𝑚𝑐𝑣
ℎ , denotes the minimum 
of the loss experienced and the deductible level d. We also assume each homeowner has an 
affordability threshold for insurance (that threshold can vary based on the home’s location in either 
the high or low risk region) where that threshold is a percentage, 𝜅𝑣, of their home values, 𝑉𝑚. 
Finally, the primary insurers will not provide homeowners with insurance if the premium is less 
than a specified level 𝜌.  
3.2.2.1  Insurance Purchasing Model 
Gao et al. (2016) used a utility model to represent the homeowner insurance decision 
making preferences. We make use of models developed in Wang et al. (2017). Based on data 
collected from a telephone survey conducted from the fall of 2012 through the spring of 2013 in 
eastern North Carolina, they develop several mixed logit models of insurance purchase behavior.  
The utilities for each homeowner 𝑛 and for each alternative 𝑗 as: 
𝑈𝑛𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑃,𝑛𝑥𝑃,𝑛𝑗 + 𝛽𝐷,𝑛𝑥𝐷,𝑛𝑗 + 𝛼𝑛
𝑇𝑧𝑛 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗 for 𝑗 = Purchase insurance 
𝑈𝑛𝑗 = 𝜀𝑛𝑗 for 𝑗 = No insurance 
where 𝛽0 is the alternative-specific constant, 𝑥𝑃,𝑛𝑗 and 𝑥𝐷,𝑛𝑗 are the premium and 
deductible of the insurance policy, respectively, 𝑧𝑛 are variables related to the homeowners and 
their homes, 𝛽𝑃,𝑛 and 𝛽𝐷,𝑛 are the coefficients estimated for the premium and deductible, 
respectively, 𝛼𝑛 are the coefficients estimated for the individual-specific variables, 𝜀𝑛𝑗 are the 
factors not observed and are assumed to be iid extreme values. Note that 𝛽𝑃,𝑛 and 𝛽𝐷,𝑛 are assumed 
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to be lognormally distributed. Since lognormal variables are always positive and an increase in 
premium and deductible always results in a decrease in the utility of the policy hence they use the 
negative of the corresponding variable values in the equation.  
3.2.2.2  Retrofit Decision Models 
We integrate mitigation decision models developed by Jasour et al. (2018) into the current 
modeling framework to include the effect of pre-event mitigation to reduce losses from hazards. 
Jasour et al. (2018) develops their models from the same survey used by Wang et al. (2017) and 
the loss model developed by Peng et al. (2013). In the survey, nine different retrofit decisions were 
asked. Among these retrofits, six are for the wind hazard and the rest three are for the flood hazard.  
As mentioned previously, the model explicitly represents the different resistance levels for 
each home type and it now includes decisions about structurally specific retrofits. Clearly 
homeowners will only mitigate to higher resistance levels. There are other restrictions as well. For 
example, for roof retrofits, either the roof sheathing is upgraded or the roof covering and the 
sheathing are upgraded at the same time. Also, given the benefit of roof upgrades, homeowners 
will do that before upgrading openings. As a final example, for roof-to-wall retrofits, these are 
only selected if they accompany upgrades to openings or the openings have already been upgraded 
(Malik et al. 2013). 
Jasour et al. (2018) estimates four mixed logit models to reflect decision-making with 
respect to four kinds of retrofits, among which three models are wind-related and one is flood-
related. It is important to note that the statistical models give the impact of making grants available. 
We do not make use of this option in the case study described below, rather, we assume that all 
upgraders are at the homeowners’ expense only.  
It is also true that not all homeowners will consider investment in each retrofit that is 
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feasible for each year. Based on the survey described in Wang et al. (2017), about 35% of home 
buyers consider retrofit at the time of home purchase. About 37% of homeowners, after a hurricane 
event they experience, will consider retrofit. Finally, about 48% of homeowners consider retrofit 
annually for other reasons (e.g. when renovating their home, hearing about a hurricane elsewhere, 
etc.). We use these statistics to govern when homeowners are given the opportunity to consider 
retrofit. 
The retrofit cost varies based on the retrofit and building category (Peng et al. 2013). Some 
retrofits are not cost beneficial for some buildings based on their configuration and their locations. 
However, since many homeowners are risk averse, they may still be willing to engage in the retrofit 
if the amount by which the cost exceeds the benefit is not too large. For this reason, we assume 
that homeowners will only consider a retrofit when its cost-effectiveness exceeds a certain 
threshold 𝛾, where 𝛾 is the difference between the cost of the retrofit and the expected losses 
avoided if the retrofit is performed.  Notice that since homeowners are generally risk averse, 𝛾, is 
a negative value. 
3.2.3  Insurer Model 
The framework assumes each insurer is a net profit maximizer. Given the price of insurance 
offered, a stochastic optimization model (where the scenarios that encapsulate the uncertainty in 
regional hurricane risk are a 30-year sequence of spatially specific hurricane events) is used to 
optimize the primary insurers’ reinsurance decisions. In a hurricane hazard ℎ, the loss of an insured 
building 𝐿ℎ is covered by several parties. Homeowners pay the first portion of the loss up to 
deductible 𝑑, denoted as 𝐵ℎ. Reinsurers pay a specified co-participation percentage, 𝛽%, of the 
loss between the attachment point, 𝐴, and the maximum limit, 𝑀 with the remaining (1- 𝛽)% paid 
by the insures. Reinsurers require an annual premium 𝑟𝑠𝑦, including a base premium 𝑏 and a 
 44 
reinstatement payment.  
The government requires that primary insurers have cash reserves to control the risk of 
insolvency. It is assumed that the primary insurers will start their businesses with an initial 
investment 𝐶𝑠0 (under scenario 𝑠) that equals a specified constant 𝑘 multiplied by the annual 
premiums received. In each year 𝑦 under scenario 𝑠, they will reallocate the amount of their 
accumulated surplus 𝐶𝑠𝑦 larger than 𝐶𝑠0 into other lines of business. When the accumulated 
surplus becomes zero or less, the primary insurer becomes insolvent. We set the profit 𝐹𝑠𝑦 and 
surplus 𝐶𝑠𝑦 to zero for the remaining years. Additionally, the State insurance regulators require 
the insurers’ capacity ratio (i.e., the leverage ratio) to be less than a given threshold, 𝜇𝑠𝑦, in each 
year. 
3.2.4  Cournot-Nash Model 
A static Cournot-Nash model is used to capture the competition between primary insurers 
on an annual basis. All primary insurers compete annually and make their decisions 
simultaneously. We assume that they do not consider the dynamic aspects of this competition and 
treat each year as a single shot game.  The carriers are assumed to be homogeneous, have the same 
knowledge of the market and only provide full coverage insurance to homeowners. This leads to 
the assumptions that they face the same cost structure and will make the same pricing decisions. 
Hence, we compute the equilibrium prices in each year for all the insurers, that is, insurers share 
the same prices in each year, but prices can be different among years.  
The homeowner model is used to derive a demand function for each risk region, 𝑄𝑣 =
𝐷𝑣(𝑝𝑣), 𝑣𝜖[𝐻, 𝐿], with its inverse: 𝑝𝑣 = 𝑃𝑣(𝑄𝑣) = 𝐷𝑣
−1(𝑄𝑣), 𝑣 ∈ [𝐻, 𝐿], where 𝑄𝑣 is the total 
insured loss covered by primary insurers or reinsurers in the entire region 𝑣 and 𝑝𝑣 is the price for 
that region. If there are 𝑛 primary insurers in the market, by symmetry, we can rewrite the inverse 
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demand function as: 𝑝𝑣 = 𝑃𝑣(𝑄𝑣) = 𝐷𝑣
−1(𝑄𝑣) = 𝐷𝑣
−1(𝑛𝑞𝑣), 𝑣 ∈ [𝐻, 𝐿], where 𝑞𝑣 is the expected 
loss insured by one primary insurer in the region 𝑣. Using the stochastic optimization model for 
an insurer, a cost function for each primary insurer in terms of the expected loss insured is 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 =
𝐶(𝑞𝐻, 𝑞𝐿). Hence the net profit for each primary insurer is derived as follows: 
 𝜋(𝑞𝐻, 𝑞𝐿) =∑𝑞𝑣𝑃𝑣(𝑛𝑞𝑣)
𝑣
− 𝐶(𝑞𝐻, 𝑞𝐿) ∀𝑣 = [𝐻, 𝐿] (1) 
Since each insurer is a net profit maximizer, if the functions are differentiable, the optimal 
solution, 𝑞𝑣
∗, satisfies the first order conditions as follows: 
 
𝜕𝜋(𝑞𝐻, 𝑞𝐿)
𝜕𝑞𝑣
= 𝑃𝑣(𝑛𝑞𝑣
∗) + 𝑞𝑣
∗
𝜕𝑃𝑣(𝑛𝑞𝑣
∗)
𝜕𝑞𝑣
−
𝜕𝐶(𝑞𝐻
∗ , 𝑞𝐿
∗)
𝜕𝑞𝑣
= 0 ∀𝑣 = [𝐻, 𝐿] (2) 
This leads to the reaction function for each insurer. 
 𝑅𝑗(𝑞−𝑗):
{
 
 
 
 
⋯
𝑞𝑣𝑗
∗ =
𝜕𝐶(𝑞𝐻
∗ , 𝑞𝐿
∗)
𝜕𝑞𝑣
− 𝑃𝑣(𝑛𝑞𝑣
∗)
𝜕𝑃𝑣(𝑛𝑞𝑣∗)
𝜕𝑞𝑣
⋯
 ∀𝑣 = [𝐻, 𝐿] (3) 
where 𝑞𝑣𝑗
∗  is the optimal solution for insurer 𝑗 in the region 𝑣, 𝑞−𝑗 are the optimal solution 
for insurer j’s competitors. Notice that insurers j’s decisions are based on the reactions of other 
insurers. 
3.2.5 Integration of the Dynamic Processes  
Figure 3.2 illustrates how these models interact over simulated time. There is an underlying 
assumption in the framework that the insurance carrier understands the risk of insuring each 
property given the characteristics of the building. Of course, these characteristics may be modified 
via retrofit and therefore that knowledge is assumed to be immediately integrated in the carriers 
pricing decisions. In contrast the homeowners purchase decisions are based on some static 
attributes, like whether or not the property is in the floodplain and the distance of the property to 
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the coastline, and some attributes that vary over time, like homeowner age, time since the 
homeowner experienced their last hurricane and the homeowners experience with hurricanes. For 
this reason, the framework is operationalized by stepping through time for each of a collection of 
scenarios where each scenario gives a time series of hurricane events over a 30-year period. Take 
together the collection of scenarios represent the regional hurricane risk. 
 
Figure 3.2. Dynamic Modeling Process using the Framework  
For each scenario the following computations are performed in this simulation-based 
framework.  
Step 0. First initialize the building inventory and the homeowner characteristics. We 
initialize homeowners’ hurricane experience based on the distribution of experience estimated in 
the telephone survey;  
In each year,  
Step 1. Homeowners decide whether or not to retrofit using the retrofit statistical models. 
Again, homeowners only consider this decision if the benefits of the retrofit exceed the cost by at 
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least 𝛾 and other conditions are satisfied as described in Section 3.2.2.2; 
Step 2. After mitigation, the expected losses are computed (using all hazard scenarios from 
the current year to the end of the planning horizon) for each property. The demand as a function 
of price is computed as is the cost to provide insurance as a function of the price of insurance. 
These cost and demand functions are done separately in the low and high risk zones; 
Step 3. Compute the equilibrium price of insurance for wind and flood in the low and high 
risk zones. Simultaneously, the insurance carriers make their decisions about reinsurance. Based 
on those prices, individual homeowners make their wind and flood insurance purchase decisions 
and the insurance carriers receive those premiums. These decisions, in the aggregate, are consistent 
with the cost and demand functions used to compute the equilibrium prices; 
Step 4. Simulate hazard events in the current year in the hurricane scenario; 
Step 5. Record the losses for the homeowners and the carriers as well as the payout from 
the carriers to the homeowners. Also, based on the losses incurred, the insurers pay a reinsurance 
reinstatement premium as required by the carrier policies with the reinsurers;  
Step 6. Update homeowner characteristics since they evolve from year to year. From 2012 
to 2016 about 16.3% of residents in North Carolina moved in each year (U.S. Census Bureau 
QuickFacts North Carolina 2017). Hence, we assume that about 1/7th of the homes are bought and 
sold in each year so the age and income of the homeowner is refreshed for these homes consistent 
with census data. Go back to Step 1 and repeat the procedure until the end of the simulation of the 
scenario or the insurers become insolvent.  
3.3  Case Study 
3.3.1  Required Inputs 
In total of 503 census tracts in Eastern North Carolina are subdivided into 731 geographic 
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zones, i, based on the distance to the coasts. We defined 8 categories, m, of wood frame residential 
buildings based on the number of stories, garage, and roof type. For each category, there are up to 
68 building resistance levels. Each zone, based on the distance to the coast, is assumed to be in 
either the low risk or high risk region.  
 As described in Section 3.2.1, we use the Optimization-based Probabilistic Scenario (OPS) 
method and use a set of hurricane events, each with an annual occurrence probability that, in the 
aggregate, represents the regional risk with respect to the spatial distribution of peak wind speeds 
and flood depths (Apivatanagul et al. 2011). These hazard events are used to develop 2,000 
scenarios of 30 years of hurricane histories each in order to compute the financial implications of 
insurance pricing decisions over time. The hazards include only storm surge flooding, and no 
effects of precipitation and inland flood are included. Note that these inputs are as same as those 
used in Peng et al. (2013) and Gao et al. (2016).  
In the insurer model, the deductible 𝑑 = $2,500, co-participation factor 𝛽% = 95%, 
administrative loading factor 𝜏 = 0.35, factor defining allowed surplus 𝑘 = 3, and the minimum 
premium 𝜌 = $100. In each year, we bound the maximum price that may be charged for insurance 
to be $5.35 per dollar of expected loss covered in both risk zones. In the simulation, we compute 
demand and cost functions for the range of price (per dollar of expected loss) levels from $1.35 to 
$5.35 with a step size of $0.001 for the demand function and $0.1 for the cost function. The value 
of $1.35 represents a zero-profit price for the insurer that just covers the transaction costs for the 
insurer ($0.35 per dollar expected loss). For retrofit, the threshold of for cost-effectiveness 𝛾 =
−300.  
We assume that homeowners in the high risk zone can afford insurance if that insurance is 
no more expensive than 𝜅𝐻 = 5% of the value of the home. In the low risk zone, we assume that 
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insurance is affordable is the cost is no more than 𝜅𝐿 = 2.5% of the value of the home. We adopt 
these values because, for the wind hazard, for all homes, the expected losses in both high and risk 
regions is less than 1% of the value of the home. This contrasts with flood hazards. More than 99% 
of the homes have an expected flood loss of less than 5% of the value of the home in the high risk 
region and in the low risk region, about 99% of the have an expected flood loss that is less than 
2.5% of value of the home. Hence, 𝜅𝐻 = 5% and 𝜅𝐿 = 2.5% allow most properties to be 
affordable when insurance is priced at the value of the expected loss. Of course, as loading factors 
rise, homeowners are priced out of the market. 
Again, wind losses are generally much less than flood losses. We assume that insurers 
provide wind and flood insurance as a package. That is, homeowners can only can purchase 
insurance that covers both hazards. It is important to notice that if their property is not subject to 
one hazard or the other, their premium will only reflect hazard they actually face because we 
assume risk-based premiums.   
3.3.2  Results of Homeowner Retrofit Model 
As mentioned previously, 35% of new home buyers consider retrofit hence we select 
randomly 35% of new home purchasers in each simulated year and apply the discrete choice 
models for retrofit to determine which (if any) retrofits they will invest in. Similarly, 37% of 
homeowners that experience a hurricane event consider retrofit. Finally, ignoring homeowners in 
the above two categories, 48% of remaining homeowners are randomly selected to consider 
retrofit. Retrofit will be undertaken only if is “cost-effective” for a threshold 𝛾 = −300. Table 3.1 
presents the distribution of the difference between retrofit costs and losses avoided for each retrofit. 
Notice that setting 𝛾 equal to -300 eliminates very few retrofits for wind but does eliminate about 
20% of possible retrofits for flood that are very expensive given the costs that would be avoided. 
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Table 3.1. Distribution of Cost-Effectiveness for Each Retrofit 
Cost- 
Effectiveness 
Wind-Related Retrofit 
Cost- 
Effectiveness 
Flood-Related 
Retrofit 
High Low High Low 
Roof Openings 
Roof-to-
wall 
Roof Openings 
Roof-to-
wall 
Flood Flood 
(-500,-400] 0.00% 0.63% 0.00% 0.00% 1.09% 0.00% 
(-1500,-
1200] 
8.51% 1.59% 
(-400,-300] 0.00% 0.73% 0.00% 0.00% 0.33% 0.00% (-1200,-900] 3.64% 0.72% 
(-300,-200] 4.68% 0.45% 0.00% 3.92% 0.14% 0.00% (-900,-600] 1.61% 0.00% 
(-200,-100] 0.81% 0.28% 0.13% 0.13% 0.25% 0.17% (-600,-300] 1.63% 0.00% 
(-100,0] 0.46% 0.13% 1.18% 0.43% 0.03% 0.53% (-300,0] 9.93% 1.32% 
(0,100] 94.05% 96.88% 98.60% 95.51% 97.38% 99.29% (0,300] 74.22% 96.37% 
(100,200] 0.00% 0.00% 0.09% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% (300,600] 0.38% 0.00% 
(200,300] 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% (600,900] 0.08% 0.00% 
(300,400] 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% (900,1200] 0.00% 0.00% 
 
In the initial building inventory data, there are in total 931,902 households in the study area 
with a total of about $258 million and $360 million expected losses in terms of wind and flood, 
respectively (Figure 3.3). The average total expected losses decrease by $13 million (5%) and $88 
million (24%) by the end of thirty years for wind and flood hazards, respectively. Although the 
total expected losses decrease in each year, the reduction in that average annual loss declines 
substantially as the thirty years unfolds. For example, the retrofits done at the beginning of the first 
year result in about a $19 million (5%) decline in expected losses. The decline in expected annual 
loss is less than 1% by year six. 
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Figure 3.3. Wind and Flood Average Total Expected Losses  
Figure 3.4 compares the average and the 5th and 95th percentiles of annual loss using the 
2,000 scenarios with and without retrofit. For example, without retrofit, the mean probability that 
the annual loss exceeds $2.5 B is about 8%. Further, there is about a 5% chance that that probability 
is actually as high as 13%. With retrofit the mean of the probability that the annual loss will exceed 
$2.5 B is about 6% and there is a 5% chance that that probability is actually about 9%. Clearly 
retrofit reduces the mean annual losses but it also reduces the probabilities of very large losses. 
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Figure 3.4. Mean, 5th and 95th Percentiles of Losses With and Without Retrofit 
Figure 3.5 gives the average retrofit decisions and the penetration rates of each retrofit (i.e., 
the number of homes undertaking retrofit divided by the number of homes eligible based on the 
cost-effectiveness criteria) across the 2,000 scenarios over the first five years. For example, on 
average, about 1,500 (0.50%) elevation retrofits were undertaken in the high risk region in the first 
year. That number dwindles to about 640 by year five. Average retrofits by type decline over the 
30 years because once a home is given a particular retrofit it is ineligible for that retrofit in the 
future. 
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Figure 3.5. Average Retrofit Decisions in the First Five Years 
Figure 3.6 shows the spatial distribution of the average percentages of homeowners 
undertaking flood- and wind-related retrofits over the 30 years across the 2,000 scenarios. As 
expected, flood-related retrofits are more frequently adopted along the coasts, compared to wind-
related retrofits.  
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Figure 3.6. Percentages of Homeowners Undertaking (a) Flood- and (b) Wind-Related Retrofits 
3.3.3  Results of Cournot-Nash Model 
Since the inventory characteristics are changing annually and by scenarios (through the 
annual retrofit decisions made in each scenario), the cost and demand functions, which are 
functions of price change annually and by scenarios; hence the equilibrium prices for insurance 
computed using the Cournot-Nash model change annually and by scenarios. Figure 3.7 gives the 
demand curves (described in Section 3.2.4) in the high and low risk regions in year one in scenario 
one for wind and flood. Figure 3.8 gives the cost surface of insurers (described in Section 3.2.5) 
in year one in scenario one. For computational purposes, polynomial functions are fitted to the 
inverse demand curves and cost surface. This process is repeated each year for each scenario. 
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Figure 3.7. Inverse Demand Curves for (a) Low and (b) High Risk Regions 
 
Figure 3.8. Approximated Optimal Cost Surface for Insurer 
Figure 3.9 presents the average, minimum and maximum equilibrium prices for high and 
low risk regions for one to five carriers. We require that prices are no greater than $5.35 per $1 of 
expected loss. Note that in the high risk region and a single monopoly carrier is not shown in 
Figure 3.8 because the equilibrium prices in that case are at the cap of $5.35 per dollar of expected 
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loss. This also occurs when there are less than four carriers in the low risk region. Notice that 
prices in the low risk region are relatively higher than those in the high risk region, which is 
consistent with the results found in Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009). Further, notice that 
prices, in the high risk region increase over the first few years. In the low risk region the prices 
decline over the first few years. After this period the prices, give the number of carriers in the 
market are constant. Prices fluctuate at the beginning of the planning horizon because of the retrofit 
process. As that process tapers off, prices become constant based on the number of carriers in the 
market.  
As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, carriers only provide policies when the premium exceeds 
$100. Also, homeowners are assumed to be able to afford the policy if the cost of the policy does 
not exceed 5% of the value of the home in the high risk region and 2.5% in the low risk region. 
These two constraints produce countervailing pressures in the market. As homes are mitigated, the 
expected losses decline. In the high risk region, that allows prices to drift up without substantially 
increasing the number of people that cannot afford insurance. In the low risk region, with falling 
prices fewer homeowners can purchase as a result of the $100 floor on policies. However, as the 
prices decline, insurance purchase for those with premiums that exceed $100, are more attractive 
for the homeowner. It is these complex interactions that cause the shifts in prices as the retrofit 
process unfolds. 
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Figure 3.9. Equilibrium Prices in (a) High and (b) Low Risk Regions 
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Figure 3.9 also presents the range of equilibrium prices across the 2,000 scenarios in both 
regions. When there is a hurricane event, the equilibrium prices for the following year increases, 
and the amount of the increase is associated with the severity of the event that occurred. For 
example, Table 3.2 presents, for the first scenario, (1) the years in which at least one hurricane 
occurred; and (2) the number and severity of the hurricanes that occurred in each of those years. 
Table 3.3 presents the equilibrium prices before and after each of those years. In the 23rd year of 
the scenario, two hurricanes occurred in the first scenario and they caused more damage to 
residential buildings then were experienced in any other year in that scenario. This led to the 
biggest increase in the equilibrium prices in the 24th year. This also illustrates why there is a larger 
range in the equilibrium prices across scenarios in the high risk region than in the low risk region. 
Also, since in most years there are no events, the average price in a given year is on the lower end 
of the range. 
Table 3.2. Summary of Hurricanes Occurred in the First Scenario 
Year 
Number of 
Hurricanes 
Flood Losses Caused ($ 
M) 
Wind Losses Caused ($ M) Total Losses Caused ($ M) 
High Low Total High Low Total High Low Total 
5 1 1,008 110 1,117 187 416 603 1,194 526 1,720 
7 1 132 ~0 132 62 137 199 195 137 331 
9 1 880 21 901 73 155 228 953 176 1,129 
17 1 880 2 882 261 171 432 1,141 173 1,314 
23 2 4,376 268 4,644 338 509 847 4,714 777 5,491 
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Table 3.3. Equilibrium Prices of Selected Years in the First Scenario 
Number of Carriers 1 2 3 4 5 
High Risk 
Year 5 5.35 2.44 2.15 1.95 1.79 
Year 6 5.35 2.46 2.16 1.96 1.80 
Low Risk 
Year 5 5.35 5.35 5.35 4.55 3.86 
Year 6 5.35 5.35 5.35 4.56 3.88 
High Risk 
Year 7 5.35 2.44 2.15 1.95 1.79 
Year 8 5.35 2.44 2.15 1.96 1.79 
Low Risk 
Year 7 5.35 5.35 5.35 4.55 3.86 
Year 8 5.35 5.35 5.35 4.55 3.87 
High Risk 
Year 9 5.35 2.43 2.14 1.95 1.79 
Year 10 5.35 2.48 2.18 1.96 1.82 
Low Risk 
Year 9 5.35 5.35 5.35 4.55 3.87 
Year 10 5.35 5.35 5.35 4.55 3.87 
High Risk 
Year 17 5.35 2.43 2.14 1.95 1.79 
Year 18 5.35 2.47 2.17 1.95 1.81 
Low Risk 
Year 17 5.35 5.35 5.35 4.55 3.87 
Year 18 5.35 5.35 5.35 4.55 3.87 
High Risk 
Year 23 5.35 2.43 2.14 1.95 1.79 
Year 24 5.35 2.50 2.19 1.98 1.82 
Low Risk 
Year 23 5.35 5.35 5.35 4.55 3.87 
Year 24 5.35 5.35 5.35 4.56 3.88 
 
Although prices in the low risk region are higher than those in the high risk region, the 
average premiums charged in the low risk region are much lower than those in the high risk region, 
as shown in Table 3.5. Note that $5.35 in Table 3.4 is artificially capped. This is because of the 
difference in the magnitude of expected losses between the low and high risk regions. The increase 
in the level of competition in the market results in a decrease in the equilibrium prices in both 
regions, as expected, and the average of premiums in both region decline as well. However, the 
average of penetration rates (i.e., the number of homes purchasing insurance divided by the total 
number of homes in the region) shows different patterns. Penetrations decrease in the low risk 
prices even though prices decrease because of the $100 minimum on policies. In the high risk 
region penetrations increase because more homeowners can afford insurance because of retrofit 
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which has caused premiums to decline because the expected losses have declined.  
Table 3.4. Summary of Average Equilibrium Prices, Average Premiums and Average Penetration 
Rates 
Number of 
Carriers 
Avg. Prices Avg. Premiums Avg. Penetration Rates 
High Low High Low High Low 
1 $5.35 $5.35 $1,663 $578 60.02% 50.14% 
2 $2.44 $5.35 $1,499 $578 69.38% 50.13% 
3 $2.14 $5.35 $1,511 $578 70.90% 50.13% 
4 $1.95 $4.59 $1,501 $554 71.82% 48.00% 
5 $1.79 $3.91 $1,447 $520 71.91% 45.32% 
  
Table 3.5 presents the thirty-year average of total, insured and uninsured expected losses 
in low and high risk regions. In both regions, as the level of competition increases, the prices 
decrease, which leads to increases in insured losses and therefore decreases in uninsured losses. 
As prices decline the market for insurance becomes larger because fewer people are closed out of 
the market due to budget limitations. In addition, as prices decline, more people are no longer 
eligible for insurance because of the $100 limit however; those homeowners are a small part of the 
market because these losses are limited. For example, in the high risk zone, the number of 
households that cannot purchase because of the budget constraint drops to about a quarter with 5 
carriers in contrast to the monopoly market. Since many more people can afford insurance with 5 
carriers, more people are actually faced with the choice of whether or not to purchase and therefore 
select not to. 
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Table 3.5. Summary of Averages of Insured, Uninsured and Total Expected Losses over Thirty 
Years 
Region 
# of 
Carriers 
Total 
Loss ($ 
M) 
Insured 
Loss ($ 
M) 
Uninsured Loss ($ M) 
Because of 
$100 Limit 
Because of 
Budget 
Constraint 
Because of 
Unwillingness of 
Purchasing 
Total 
Low  
Risk 
1 
142  
$81 $22 37% $19 31% $20 32% $61 
2 $81 $22 37% $19 31% $20 32% $61 
3 $81 $22 37% $19 31% $20 32% $61 
4 $82 $25 42% $15 25% $20 34% $60 
5 $82 $28 47% $12 20% $20 33% $60 
High  
Risk 
1 
376  
$92 $3 1% $257 90% $25 9% $284 
2 $173 $6 3% $136 67% $62 30% $204 
3 $196 $7 4% $98 55% $75 42% $180 
4 $213 $7 4% $72 44% $84 51% $163 
5 $222 $8 5% $60 39% $87 56% $154 
 
Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11 present the profit per firm and the total insured expected losses 
over 30 years across the 2,000 scenarios, respectively. As the level of competition increases, the 
firm profitability drops substantially, however, the total insured losses increase due to the decline 
in market prices. This decline in profitability as competition increases negatively impacts 
insolvency rates (Table 3.6). Average profit decreases very marginally in the first several years 
due to retrofit.  
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Figure 3.10. Annual Profit per Firm 
 
Figure 3.11. Total Insured Expected Losses 
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Table 3.6. Averages of Insolvency Rates in High and Low Risk Regions 
Number of 
Carriers 
Insolvency Rates 
High Low 
1 1.54% 1.13% 
2 1.98% 1.32% 
3 2.05% 1.65% 
4 2.09% 1.76% 
5 2.13% 1.89% 
 
3.4  Conclusions 
In this chapter, we presented a dynamic framework for modeling the natural hazard 
catastrophe loss insurance market. The framework captures the evolving interactions between key 
stakeholders (home owners, insurers, reinsurers, and the government) in the market, and the 
competition between insurers. Exercising the model on a case study of eastern North Carolina, as 
expected, indicate that the level of concentration in the insurance market can lead to significant 
differences in the operational decisions for insurance firms. As competition in the market 
increases, there are a substantial decrease in equilibrium prices which is associated with a decrease 
in the profit for the insurance firms. With a single carrier about 33% of the annual average total 
loss is insured. At 5 carriers, insured loss reaches almost 60%. Even at 5 carriers, about 14% of 
the expected loss remains uninsured due to affordability when the threshold for affordability are 
5% and 2.5% of the value of the home in the high risk and low risk zones, respectively. It is 
important to notice that these values are rather high compared to the standards for affordability 
suggested in the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 (HFIAA 2014). HFIAA 
suggests a standard for affordability of 1% of the value of the home. That is, premiums that exceed 
the 1% threshold are assumed to be unaffordable (NRC, 2015).  
Retrofit leads to about 16% decrease in expected losses but has a relatively minor impact 
on insurance prices. Also prices, even with substantial competition, are higher in the low risk 
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region; but, since the hazard is much greater, premiums charged in the high risk region substantial 
outpace those in the low risk region. 
Future research in at least two directions is particularly useful. First, this modeling does 
not consider any opportunity for the government to acquire repetitive high loss properties. To 
control escalating costs associated with hurricanes, reducing the number of large dollar repetitive 
loss properties is likely to be very important. Finally, it is important to extend this work to 
understand how government programs to support mitigation can be effectively designed and how 
much risk can be “bought out” via this strategy.  
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